Zbigniew Jaworowski(*)
BENEFICIAL RADIATION AND REGULATIONS
Proceedings of ICONE 8 8th International Conference on Nuclear
Engineering April 2-6, 2000, Baltimore, MD USA, Paper No. 8790
Abstract Administrative acceptance of the
linear, no-threshold dose/effect relationship (LNT) for radiological
protection was convenient for regulatory bodies, but is impractical, and
inconsistent with observations on beneficial effects of low doses and dose
rates of radiation, with a lack of increased malignancy and hereditary
disorders in inhabitants of areas with high natural radiation background,
and with a lack of genetic effects in progeny of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
survivors. Man-made contribution to the average global individual
radiation dose from all commercial nuclear power plants, nuclear
explosions and Chernobyl accident, amounts now to about 0.4%, and from
medical x-ray diagnostics 20% of the average natural dose of 2.2 mSv per
year. The natural dose is in many regions of the world two orders of
magnitude higher than the current exceedingly low dose limit for
population of 1 mSv per year. act text here.
KEYWORDS: natural radiation, hormesis, collective dose, dose
commitment
INTRODUCTION A prompt criticality
accident occurred in September last year at a nuclear plant Tokaimura,
Japan. Three workers absorbed potentially lethal radiation doses of about
4500 to more than 20 000 milisieverts (mSv). One of them died on 83rd day
after the accident. Other was discharged from the hospital on 82nd day,
and the third, with skin lesions is successfully treated by skin grafts .
Radionuclides produced in this accident by the short-term fission
reaction, entered the atmosphere, but no significant ground contamination
was found outside the plant boundary. Notwithstanding, the local
authorities evacuated 150 residents and urged another 310 000 to stay
indoors. . Compared with other industrial accidents occurring every day
over the world, and which result in about 12 000 deaths per year in the
United States alone, the Tokaimura incident does not seem to have been
very serious. Nevertheless, it was described by the media and by IAEA
officials as "the world's third worst nuclear accident behind Chernobyl
and Three Mile Island", and the worst nuclear accident in Japan, all of
which is indeed correct. In Japan, nuclear power has been in operation
since 1965. Today, 35 years later, almost 36% of its electric power is
produced by 53 nuclear reactors. One fatal victim during so long time just
proves the excellent safety of the vast nuclear industry in Japan. Every
year during the last decade, due to fatal accidents at work, Poland
suffered the loss of anywhere between 20 to 110 miners, to produce about
half of Japan's electric power output, almost exclusively by burning coal.
Why then Tokaimura incident evoke such enormous media outcry? Why did
it provoke such a vehement reaction from the public and from local and
international authorities? Why had, for several days, the Emergency
Response Center of IAEA in Vienna, given reports on the accident,
sometimes five times daily, to all Permanent (national) Missions to the
IAEA, and to 213 National (emergency) Contact Points all over the world?
Why President Clinton ordered a safety survey of all American nuclear
facilities, as if what had occured in Japan could somehow extend to the
United States? Nothing like this occurs in any other industry when three
workers get electrocuted, or flashed by a hot fumes, or die when a cloud
of ammonia escapes from a factory or a railway tank. Any minor, leak of
radioactivity from a broken tube in a reactor, even if completely innocent
and bearing not relevance to the overall safety of the plant, is trumpeted
throughout the world, and is used to direct mass emotions against the
inherently safe and environmentally friendly nuclear energy. What makes
people demand that nuclear industry to be a zero accident enterprise? Yet,
at the same time, the same people appear to willingly accept all other
kinds of man-made accidents, including the some 17 million deaths
estimated to be caused by cars since their invention. What causes this
paranoiac imbalance? An attempt to answer these questions is the subject
of this presentation. The Chernobyl catastrophe resulted in vast
quantities of radionuclides being released into the global atmosphere,
which were easy to measure even high in the stratosphere, and far away at
the South Pole . It was a godsend for anti-nuclear activists. Yet
according to estimates of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the
Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), one of the most distinguished
international authority in matters of ionizing radiation, there were only
31 early death among the plant workers and rescue operators, and no early
death among the public. Thirteen years after the accident, apart from
an increase in thyroid cancer registry (very likely due to increased
screening rather than a real increase in incidence), there is no evidence
of a major public health impact related to the ionizing radiation, and no
increase of overall cancer incidence or mortality that could be associated
with radiation exposure. There is no scientific proof of any increase in
other non-malignant disorders, genetic, somatic or mental, that could be
related to ionizing radiation from Chernobyl. This UNSCEAR estimate is
clearly quite different from what one finds in most media, which prefer to
cultivate mass radiophobia - an irrational fear of radiation and all
things nuclear. But who reads UNSCEAR reports? Chernobyl was the worst
possible catastrophe of a badly constructed nuclear power reactor:
complete core meltdown, followed by free dispersion of radionuclides in
the atmosphere, and with an area of lethal fallout, of only 0.5 km2,
reaching up to 1800 meters from the reactor. Nothing worse could happen
with any reactor. It resulted in comparatively minute death toll,
amounting to about half of that of each weekend's traffic in Poland. When
the irrational rumble and emotions of Chernobyl finally settle down, in
the centuries to come, this catastrophe will be seen as a proof that
nuclear fission reactors are a safe means of energy production. Several
accidents at hydroelectric, gas and coal energy production, and other
industrial catastrophes in the 20th century, each caused up to three
orders of magnitude greater death toll than the Chernobyl accident (Table
1). In the highly contaminated regions of the former Soviet Union,
from which 270,000 people were evacuated and relocated, the 1986-95
average radiation doses from the Chernobyl fallout ranged between 6 and 60
mSv. By comparison, the world's average individual lifetime dose due to
natural background radiation is about 150 mSv. In the
Chernobyl-contaminated regions of the former Soviet Union, the natural
lifetime dose is 210 mSv - in many regions of the world it is about 1000
mSv, and in the state of Kerala, India, or in parts of Iran reaches 5000
mSv. Yet no adverse genetic, carcinogenic, or any other deleterious
effects of those higher, doses have been ever observed among the people,
animals, and plants that have lived in those parts since time immemorial ;
; ; ; . The forced evacuation of 270,000 people from their, presumably,
poisoned homes, and other forms of overreaction of Soviet authorities (for
example the famous "coffin subsidy" - a monthly financial compensation),
did not result in a benefit, but instead induced some real harm: an
epidemics of psychosomatic disorders observed in the 15 million people of
Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, such as diseases of endocrinological system,
circulatory and gastrointestinal diseases, depression and other
psychological disturbances, headaches, sleeping disturbances, difficulties
in concentration, emotional instability, inability to work and so on . The
"coffin subsidy", which in impoverished Belarus will total $86 billion by
2015 , for millions of recipients, each time they sign a receipt, confirms
that they are the "victims of Chernobyl". The psychosomatic disorders
could not be attributed to the ionizing radiation, but were assumed to be
linked to the popular belief that any amount of man-made radiation - even
miniscule, close to zero doses - can cause harm. This assumption, linear,
no-threshold theory (LNT) was accepted in the 1950s, arbitrarily, as the
basis for regulations on radiation and nuclear safety, now still in force.
It was under this assumption and regulations that the Soviet government
decided on the mass relocation of people from regions in which the
Chernobyl radiation dose was much smaller than natural radiation
background in many countries. This act of Soviet authorities demonstrated
not only absurdity of LNT, but also the harmful effects of practical
application of regulations based on this principle. During the last
three decades, the principles and regulations of radiation protection have
gone astray and have lead to exceedingly prohibitive, LNT-derived
standards and recommendations. Revision of these principles, being now
proposed by many scientists and several organizations, was evoked both by
an eye opening Chernobyl experience, and by recent progress in
radiobiology, genetics and oncology. Radiation carcinogenesis should no
longer be perceived as a straightforward process started by a random hit
by radiation to the DNA double strand in the cell. The complexity of this
process precludes the use of direct proportionality even to estimate
probability of the malignant cell becoming a macroscopic, clinically
verifiable tumor. After a total malignant transformation, the cell has to
divide some billions of times, before a cancer is formed. Such transformed
cells appear to be distant from cancer by so many billions of iterative
steps, that their outcome cannot be predicted, as a matter of principle .
A great radiobiologist, the late Harald Rossi summarized the situation
as follows: "It would appear...that radiation carcinogenesis is an
intricate intercellular process and that the notion that it is caused by
simple mutations in a unicellular response is erroneous. Thus, there is no
scientific basis for the "linearity hypothesis" according to which cancer
risk is proportional to absorbed dose and independent of dose rate at low
doses" . One of the factors responsible for these winds of change is
recognizing by many scientists that small doses of radiation, like small
doses of other physical or chemical agents, may be beneficial for
organisms, and evoke a stimulatory or hormetic response, which is in
direct opposition to the LNT. About 2000 scientific papers on radiation
hormesis were published in the 20th century. However, when in 1982 I
proposed that UNSCEAR should review and assess these papers, nobody seemed
interested. Each following year I had repeated this proposal in vain,
until after Chernobyl, in 1987, it finally gained support from the
representatives of France and Germany. It took UNSCEAR some dozen years of
deliberations before in 1994 the Committee published its fundamental
report , rubberstamping the very existence of phenomenon of hormesis. It
was difficult for the Committee to overcome its own prejudices on
radiation hormesis, and to produce a balanced objective report. Along the
way, the Committee rejected two rather one-sided drafts of "hormesis
document", but in 1990 also an excellent document on "Hereditary Effects
of Radiation", prepared by a leading expert in the field, professor F.
Vogel. This last rejection demonstrated a hesitating mood of the
Committee, as the Vogel's paper showed lack of genetic effects after
Chernobyl accident, presented the existence of hormetic effects in
children of Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors, and the lack of any
hereditary disorders both in these children, and in inhabitants of high
natural background radiation areas. The draft of UNSCEAR 1994 "hormetic
report" was prepared by Dr. Hylton Smith, then the Scientific Secretary of
the ICRP, a body strongly supporting LNT and rejecting hormesis. However,
working for a few years on this report, Dr. Smith changed his initially
negative approach to radiation hormesis, and finely produced an excellent,
unbiased treatise on this yet unfathomed matter, demonstrating his
scientific integrity. This report sparked in the radiation protection
community a quasi revolution, which is now gaining momentum, with some
encouragement from the chairman of ICRP, professor Roger Clarke .
NATURAL AND MAN-MADE The linear no-threshold
hypothesis was accepted in 1959 by the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP) as a philosophical basis for radiological
protection . This decision was based on the first report of the, then just
established, UNSCEAR committee . Large part of this report was dedicated
to a discussion of linearity and of the threshold dose for adverse
radiation effects. UNSCEAR's stand on this subject, more than forty years
ago, was formed after an in-depth debate, not however without any
influence of the political atmosphere and issues of the time. Soviet,
Czechoslovakian and Egyptian delegations to UNSCEAR strongly supported the
LNT assumption, using it as a basis for recommendation of an immediate
cessation of nuclear test explosions. The then prevailing target theory
and the then new results of genetic experiments with fruit flies
irradiated with high doses and dose rates, strongly influenced this
debate. In 1958 UNSCEAR stated that contamination of the environment by
nuclear explosions increase radiation levels all over the world, posing
new and unknown hazards for the present and future generations. These
hazards cannot be controlled and "even the smallest amounts of radiation
are liable to cause deleterious genetic, and perhaps also somatic,
effects". This sentence had an enormous impact in the next decades, being
repeated in a plethora of publications, and taken even now as an article
of faith by the public. However, throughout the whole 1958 report, the
original UNSCEAR view on LNT remained ambivalent. At example, UNSCEAR
accepted as a threshold for leukemia a dose of 4000 mSv (page 42), but at
the same time the committee accepted the risk factor for leukemia of 0.52%
per 1000 mSv, assuming LNT (page 115). Committee quite openly presented
this difficulty, showing in one table (page 42) its consequences:
continuation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere was estimated to
cause 60,000 leukemia cases worldwide if no threshold is assumed, and zero
leukemia cases if a threshold of 4000 mSv exists. In final conclusions the
UNSCEAR pinpointed this situation: "Linearity has been assumed
primarily for purposes of simplicity",; and "There may or may not
be a threshold dose. Two possibilities of threshold and no-threshold have
been retained because of the very great differences they engender".
In the ICRP document of 1959 no such controversy appears, LNT was
arbitrarily assumed, and serious epistemological problems related to
impossibility of finding harmful effects at very low levels of radiation
{later discussed by and } were ignored. Over the years the working
assumption of ICRP of 1959 came to be regarded as a scientifically
documented fact by mass media, public opinion and even many scientists.
The LNT principle, however, belongs to the realm of administration and is
not a scientific principle. In these early years the LNT assumption
did not seem very realistic, but was generally accepted because it
simplified regulatory work. The original purpose was to regulate the
exposure to radiation of a relatively small group of occupationally
exposed persons, and it did not involve exceedingly high costs. In the
1970s, however, ICRP extended the LNT principle to exposure of the general
population to man-made radiation, and in the 1980s it extended LNT
limiting the exposure to natural sources of radiation . In the same
document ICRP recommended restriction of radiation exposure of members of
the public to 1 mSv per year, that is below the average annual global
natural radiation dose of 2.2 mSv, and many tens or hundreds of times
lower than the natural doses in many regions of the world. Such an
absurdly low limitation of exposure was a logical consequence of
administrative LNT assumption from 1959. It made a false impression in the
public that new research steadily discovers a greater harmfulness of
radiation, which needs more protection, more money, and lower standards.
In fact nothing like this occurred. Since introduction of rational
standards in the 1930s, which were based on tolerance dose concept, and
were orders of magnitude higher than now, no deleterious effects were
found among those that observed them (Taylor, 1981). This constant
decreasing of standards, however, was less than palatable to many
scientists associated with radiation protection, standing both on purely
scientific and practical grounds. One of the important factors in changing
opinion of many scientists was finding actual proportions between man-made
and natural exposures. Data published in the UNSCEAR documents clearly
show that the average individual global radiation dose in 1990 from
nuclear explosions, the Chernobyl accident, and commercial nuclear plants
combined was about 0.4% of the average natural dose of 2.2 mSv per year.
In areas of the former Soviet Union that were highly contaminated by
Chernobyl fallout, the average individual dose was much lower than that in
regions with high natural radiation. The greatest man-made contribution to
radiation dose has been irradiation from x-ray diagnostics in medicine,
which accounts for about 20% of the average natural radiation dose (Figure
1). From the medical point of view, it does not matter whether ionizing
radiation comes from natural or from man-made sources: its nature is the
same. We do not observe any adverse effects of irradiation from Mother
Nature's sources: no increase of cancers and hereditary disorders was ever
found in natural high radiation areas. The concern about large doses, such
as absorbed by three workers in Tokaimura or by 28 fatal radiation victims
in Chernobyl, is obviously justified. But should we spend enormous funds
to protect people against radiation corresponding to tiny fractions of
natural doses, only because humans make them? Few billion years ago,
when life on Earth began, the natural level of ionizing radiation was
about three to five times higher than it is now . At the early stages of
evolution, increasingly complex organisms developed powerful defense
mechanisms against adverse effects of this radiation, and of all kinds of
environmental factors, for example against toxicity of oxygen and other
innumerable inorganic and organic toxins, and dangerous physical agents,
including the whole range of radiation energy spectrum. Living organisms
developed not only protective mechanisms against these environmental
agents, but they learned how to use them to their advantage. We see this
readily in the case of visible light and UV radiation. UV radiation
belongs to the ionizing part of the spectrum. It is rather doubtful that
other types of ionizing radiation were excluded from this evolutionary
adaptive process. The phenomenon of radiation hormesis observed in man,
and in animals argues against such exclusion. On the other hand, that the
evolution proceeded for so long is proof of the effectiveness of living
things' defenses against environmental agents, including ionizing
radiation. The adverse effects of ionizing radiation, such as mutation
and malignant change, originate in the cell nucleus, where the DNA is
their primary target. Other adverse effects - which lead to acute
radiation sickness and premature death in humans, also originate in the
cell, but outside its nucleus. For them to take place requires radiation
doses thousands of times higher than those from natural sources. A nuclear
explosion or a cyclotron beam could deliver such a dose; so could a
defective medical or industrial radiation source - Tokaimura and Chernobyl
are two examples. An artificial distinction between these two types of
effects: (1) starting in the DNA of the cell nucleus, and (2) outside the
nucleus was made by introducing terms of "stochastic effects" for late
malignant and hereditary changes, and "deterministic effects" for early
acute changes and cataracts . Medicine does not recognize such a
distinction. In fact, it was a tacit introduction of the LNT thinking
template into radiation protection. By definition, stochastic
(probabilistic) effect is "an all-or nothing effect, the severity of which
does not vary with dose" , and which distinguishes them from
"deterministic" effects, the severity of which increases with dose.
However, both notions: stochastic and deterministic effects seem
rather empty and obsolete, in view of the new information on mechanisms of
carcinogenesis and genetics. The lack of dose related severity in
stochastic effects - the main difference between them and deterministic
effects, is simply not true. As demonstrated by many radiogenic cancers in
man and in experimental animals show greater histologic and clinical
malignancy after high radiation doses than after smaller ones. Also
latency time is shortened when the dose increases, so the malignant tumors
can have more time to develop during a lifetime. According to recent
studies, by far the most DNA damage in humans is spontaneous and is caused
by thermodynamic decay processes and by reactive free radicals formed by
the oxygen metabolism. Each mammalian cell suffers about 70 million
spontaneous DNA-damaging events per year . More recent measurements of
steady state oxygen free radical damages to DNA (Helbock et al., 1998) and
their repair rates (Jaruga, Dizderoglu, 1996) demonstrate about 350
million metabolic DNA oxidamages per cell per year. Only if armed with a
powerful defense system could a living organism survive such a high rate
of DNA damage. An effective defense system consists of mechanisms that
repair DNA, and other homeostatic mechanisms that maintain the integrity
of organisms, both during the life of the individual and for thousands of
generations. Among those homeostatic mechanisms are antioxidants,
enzymatic reactions, apoptosis (suicidal elimination of changed cells),
immune system removal of cells with persistent DNA alterations, cell cycle
regulation, and intercellular interactions. Ionizing radiation damages
DNA also, but at a much lower rate. At the present average individual dose
rate of 2.2 mSv per year, natural radiation could be responsible for no
more than about 5 DNA-damaging events in one cell per year. Why with a
background of 70 million spontaneous DNA damages per cell per year, should
we protect people against 2.3 DNA damages per cell per year, expected from
1 mSv annual dose limit recommended by ICRP? Though spontaneous repairing
of double strand break damages of DNA occurs rarely compared to their
occurrence in radiation damage, spontaneous oxygen metabolism induces
about 1000 timeas as many double strand breaks as background radiation
(Stewart, 1999). In this perspective even a limit permitting for 200 DNA
damages per cell per year, or 100 mSv per year, would be proper. As
compared with other noxious agents, ionizing radiation should be regarded
as rather feeble. The safety margin for ionizing radiation is much larger
than for many other agents present in the environment, e.g. thermal
changes, plant and animal poisons, or heavy metals. For example, a toxic
level of lead in blood is only 3 times higher than its "normal" level. A
lethal dose of ionizing radiation delivered in one hour - which for an
individual human is 3000 to 5000 mSv - is a factor of 10 million higher
than the average natural radiation dose received in the same time (0.00027
mSv). Nature seems to have provided living organisms with an enormous
safety margin for natural levels of ionizing radiation - and also,
adventitiously, for man-made radiation from controlled, peacetime sources.
Conditions in which levels of ionizing radiation could be noxious do not
normally occur in the biosphere, so humans required no radiation-sensing
organ and none evolved, although all species have always been immersed in
the sea of radiation ever since life began.
WHY RADIOPHOBIA? If radiation and
radioactivity, though ubiquitous, are so innocuous at normal levels, why
do they cause such universal apprehension? What is the cause of
radiophobia, an irrational fear that any level of radiation is dangerous?
Why have radiation protection authorities introduced a dose limit for the
public of 1 mSv per year, which is less than half the average dose rate
from natural radiation, and less than 1% of the natural dose rates in many
areas of the world? Why do the nations of the world spend many billions of
dollars a year to maintain this standard ? In a recent paper I proposed
some likely reasons :
- The psychological reaction to devastation and loss of life caused by
the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World
War II.
- Psychological warfare during the cold war that played on the
public's fear of nuclear weapons.
- Lobbying by fossil fuel industries.
- The interests of radiation researchers striving for recognition and
budget.
- The interests of politicians for whom radiophobia has been a handy
weapon in their power games (in the 1970s in the USA, and in the 1980s
and 1990s in eastern and western Europe and in the former Soviet Union).
- The interest of news media that profit by inducing public fear.
- The interest of "greens" that profit by inducing public fear.
- The assumption of a linear, no-threshold relationship between
radiation and biological effects (LNT). In addition, a very important
factor was:
Complaisance of nuclear industry leadership,
paralyzed by anti-nuclear propaganda. Intimidated industry accepted
irrational standards, and did not develop research programs to check the
validity of LNT. During the past five decades nuclear weapons were
regarded as a deterrent, and the countries that possess them wished to
make radiation and radioactivity seem as dreadful as possible. Therefore,
national security agencies seldom correct even the most obviously false
statements, such as often voiced: "Radiation from a nuclear war can
annihilate all mankind, or even all life", or (the ever authoritative
International Herald Tribune) "200 grams of plutonium could kill every
human being on Earth" . The facts say otherwise. According to UNSCEAR
reports, between 1945 and 1980, the 541 atmospheric nuclear tests,
injected into the global atmosphere about 3000 kilograms of plutonium
(that is, almost 15 000 supposedly deadly 200-gram doses), yet lo and
behold: somehow we are still alive! (Try to publish this in the
International Herald Tribune: no way). According to UNSCEAR data, from
all these 541 atmospheric explosions with a total energy yield of 440
megatons of TNT, we accumulated between 1945 and 1998, an average
individual radiation dose of about 1 mSv, what is less than 1% of the dose
from natural sources over the same period. In the heyday of atmospheric
testing, 1961 and 1962, there were 176 atmospheric explosions, with a
total energy yield of 84 megatons. The average individual dose accumulated
from the fallout between 1961 and 1964 was about 0.35 mSv. At its cold
war peak of 50 000 weapons, the global nuclear arsenal had a combined
potential explosive power of about 13 000 megatons, which was only 30
times larger than the megatonnage already released in the atmosphere by
all previous nuclear tests. If that whole global nuclear arsenal had been
deployed in the same places as the previous nuclear tests, the average
individual would have received a lifetime radiation dose from the global
fallout of about 30 to 55 mSv, a far cry from the short-term dose of 3000
mSv that would kill a human. For several decades, humanity had lived
under the gloomy shadow of imminent nuclear annihilation. This had
extremely negative influence not only on public perception of radiation
and nuclear energy, but induced a cultural change: an distrust of science,
rejuvenation of irrational apocalyptic mythologies, and even aversive
approach to civilization, the fruit of toil and sweat of ourselves and of
our forefathers.
HIROSHIMA, NAGASAKI AND
LNT The survivors of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
who received instantaneous radiation doses of less than 200 mSv have not
suffered significant induction of cancers . Among 59 539 inhabitants of
these two cities that absorbed doses up to 1990 mSv, 119 persons died
between 1950 and 1985, due to leukemia, i.e. about 0.006% per year, and 4
319 persons died due to all other cancers, i.e. 0.2% . According to the
Polish Cancer Registry data, in 1993 0.006% people died in Poland due to
leukemia, and about 0.2% due to all other cancers . This comparison shows
that with doses of up to near 2000 mSv we should not expect any detectable
epidemic of malignances. Among the bomb survivors irradiated with doses
lower than 150 mSv mortality caused by leukemia was lower (although
statistically not significant) than among the non-irradiated inhabitants
of two Japanese cities . A slight, but non significant, decrease in
overall non-cancer mortality among bomb survivors exposed to low and
intermediate dose can also be seen in the data of Atomic Bomb Casualty
Commission and the Radiation Effects Research Foundation . So far, after
50 years of study, the progeny of Japanese survivors who were exposed to
these and much higher, near lethal doses had not developed any adverse
genetic effects . Until recently, such findings from the study of
A-bomb survivors has been consistently ignored. In place of the actual
findings has been the theory of linear no-threshold (LNT), which presumes
that the detrimental effects of radiation are proportional to the dose,
and that there is no dose at which the effects of radiation are not
detrimental. LNT theory played an important role in effecting first a
moratorium and then a ban on atmospheric nuclear tests. But otherwise its
role was mostly negative, inducing worldwide fear of radiation and
effective strangulation of development of nuclear energy systems in many
countries, including the United States. My own country, Poland, spent
billions of dollars on construction of its first nuclear power station,
only to abandon the project after politically motivated manipulation of
the public opinion by means of the LNT theory. The mechanism of
inducing fear is quite simple. For example, one calculates, very exactly,
that 28 000 people would die of Chernobyl-induced cancers over the next 50
years, and news media trumpet this, or much greater values all over the
world, now and again, and ad nauseam. The frightening death toll was
derived by multiplying the trifling Chernobyl doses in the Northern
Hemisphere, including Canada and the United States (0.0046 mSv per person)
by the vast number of people leaving there and by a cancer risk factor
based on epidemiological studies of 75 000 atomic bomb survivors in Japan
. But the A-bomb survivor data are irrelevant to such estimates, because
of the difference in the individual doses and dose rates. A-bomb survivors
were flashed within about one second by radiation doses at least 50 000
times higher than dose which US inhabitants will ever receive, over the
period of 50 years, from the Chernobyl fallout. We have reliable
epidemiological data for a dose rate of, say, 6000 mSv per second in
Japanese A-bomb survivors. But there are no such data for human exposure
at a dose rate of 0.0046 mSv over 50 years (nor will there ever be any).
The dose rate in Japan was larger by 2 x 1015 than the Chernobyl dose rate
in the USA. Extrapolating over such a vast span is neither scientifically
justified nor epistemologically acceptable. It is also morally suspect .
An offspring of the LNT assumption is the concept of dose commitment,
introduced in the early 1960, and of collective dose. Dose commitment
reflected the great concern, at that time, that harmful hereditary effects
could be induced by fallout from nuclear tests. The concern was so great,
that according to definition, dose commitment values were to be calculated
for periods of time ending in the infinity. In later years, the individual
dose commitments, and collective dose commitments, also for some truncated
periods, were calculated mainly for exposures from nuclear power. For
example, UNSCEAR calculated 205 000 man Sv for the next 10 000 years from
power reactors and reprocessing plants, 600 000 man Sv from Chernobyl
fallout in the Northern Hemisphere for eternity, and 650 000 000 mSv for
the world's population from only past 50 years of exposure to natural
radiation. These large values, terrifying as they are to the general
public, provide society with no relevant biological or medical
information. Rather, they create a false image of the imminent danger of
radiation, with its all actual negative social and psychosomatic
consequences. But why to stop at 50 years calculating dose commitments for
natural radiation, when for man-made radiation, one make estimates over
infinite time? For example, the individual dose commitment, supposedly
accumulated over the past 130 000 years of existence of the modern Homo
sapiens, and calculated for now living average human, is 286 000 mSv, i.e.
about hundred short term lethal doses. Each of us is burdened with this or
similar value of dose commitment. Do these values represent anything real,
or are they just figments of scholastic fantasies? What are the medical
effects of these enormously high doses? I proposed in a recent paper ,
that the intellectually invalid concepts of collective dose and dose
commitment be hacked off with William of Occam's razor.
Acknowledgments I am indebted to Dr. Michael Waligórski for
stimulating discussion and comments.
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Zbigniew Jaworowski Central Laboratory for Radiological
Protection Ul. Konwaliowa 7, 03-194 Warsaw, Poland Voice: (+48-22)
717-5260; fax: 717-5324; jaworo@clor.waw.pl
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